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Abstract Many science systems are witnessing the rise of intermediary organi-
zations with a coordinating mission, but to date a systematic understanding of their
function and effects is lacking. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the
understanding of the coordinating efforts of intermediary organizations. Starting
from the definition of coordination as the establishment or strengthening of a
relationship among the activities in a system, with the aim to enhance their common
effectiveness, I develop a heuristic framework that facilitates the systematic analysis
of coordination in science. I illustrate and substantiate my framework with the
empirical case study of a Dutch coordination task force in the area of chemical
technologies. Thanks to the framework I could disentangle a number of functions
that this task force fulfils concerning research programming, funding allocation and
supporting interactions and collaborations. This approach enabled me to systemat-
ically analyse a very heterogeneous set of processes that each deserve to be called
coordination. The analysis yields a clear overview of eight coordination processes
that are each described in terms of activities, intervention, relationships, mecha-
nisms and performance. I conclude my paper with suggestions for further research
on coordination in the science system.
Keywords Coordination  Science policy  Intermediary organization 
Innovation  Research programme
Introduction
As they are generally seen as a key to improving the innovative capacity, public-
private partnerships receive generous support of science and innovation policies
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(Potı` and Reale 2007; Fisher et al. 2001; Gray 2011). Public-private partnerships
(PPPs) tend to take the form of collaborative networks or research consortia that can be
classified as intermediary organizations. Mediating between the government and the
research performance level, they offer a solution for delegation problems in science
policy (Braun 2003). In the Netherlands, for example, several coordinating bodies
have been established to boost scientific progress and innovation in strategic areas (van
der Meulen and Rip 1998; Versleijen 2007). They bring together researchers with
different disciplinary and institutional backgrounds in order to enhance scientific
productivity, economic competitiveness and/or social development.
With the rise of PPPs, a new type of organization has entered the science system
with a hybrid mission that can be summarized as coordination. Such intermediaries
typically fulfil various interrelated functions, ranging from the allocation of funding
(Klerkx and Leeuwis 2008) to negotiations about subsidies and legitimacy (Kearnes
and Wienroth 2011).
From a policy perspective, a systematic understanding of this new organization is
desirable to enable performance evaluation and evidence-based decision making.
Although coordination is usually considered desirable, it comes with a price. Even if
coordinating bodies do not require large financial investments, they might absorb
substantial amounts of time that academics would have otherwise spent on research.
Moreover, if there are too many coordinating bodies, they may interfere with or
inhibit each other’s effects. To date, however, the understanding of coordinating
intermediaries is limited.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the coordinating
efforts of intermediary organizations in the science system. To this end, I will
provide a theoretical elaboration on the notion of coordination based on a
combination of science policy literature and socio-economic theories of coordina-
tion. I will illustrate and substantiate my theoretical framework with an empirical
case study of ACTS, a Dutch task force with the mission to stimulate and coordinate
research in the area of chemical technologies.
Theoretical Framework
As a first step towards the development of a theoretical framework on coordination
in science, let us briefly review existing literature on this topic. The notion of
coordination has been applied many times in science (policy) studies to describe and
analyse a variety of different phenomena, ranging from collaborations between
individual researchers within a common research project to the mutual adjustment
between national policies for science, innovation and education. Within this
diversity, three categories of topics can be identified: the academic system, science
and innovation policies, and collaborations, respectively (see Table 1). Although
these various papers have different goals than mine, they do offer useful building
blocks for a coherent definition of coordination in science.
First, some studies focus on coordination in the academic system as a whole, that
is, on the interactions among the researchers, organizations and institutions that
shape the progress of science. Whitley (2003) speaks of ‘intellectual coordination’
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as a social process among scientists in which tasks are divided and individual
contributions are made compatible through common research procedures and
routines. Van Lente and Rip (1998) focus on coordination by technological
expectations. They claim that a shared future vision of a promising technology can
steer the actions of scientists, policymakers, firms and others. Burton Clark (1979)
regards coordination pathways as ‘basic processes that link fields of study and
institutions together so as to compose systems’ (p. 255). Polanyi (1962) discusses
Table 1 Contributions to science (policy) studies dealing prominently and explicitly with coordination
Domain of
application
Authors Explicit definition Implicit definition
Academic
system
Whitley (2003) Task division across research sites
Van Lente & Rip
(1998)
Mutual positioning and agenda
building by technological
expectations
Clark (1979) Processes creating order in loosely
coupled systems
Polanyi (1962) Independent initiatives adjusting
themselves consecutively to the
results achieved by others
Policy Lepori (2011) ‘organizing social action
in a world where there
is no overall mind’
(p. 359)
Clark (2010) Managing linkages among
innovation policy (at different
scales) and regional development
policy
Braun (2008) Creating efficiency and coherence
among various public policies
Edler & Kuhlmann
(2008)
Task division and mutual
adjustment among policies across
organizations and across levels of
aggregation
Van Vught (1997) Mechanisms underlying
governmental policy strategies















Note that other publications discuss similar phenomena using notions like governance, adjustment or
alignment (Bonaccorsi 2008). Although I have not included these in the overview, some of them have
informed my framework presented in the latter part of this section
Coordination in the Science System 319
123
‘self-coordination’, which means that researchers adjust their activities spontane-
ously to the results achieved by others, guided by a quasi-economic ‘invisible hand’.
A second—and relatively large—category contains studies dealing with the
coordination of science and innovation policies. Within this category, some studies
deal with one policy domain in particular so that their analyses concern mainly the
relationship between the government (as a principal) and the research performing
organizations (as agents). Lepori (2011) focuses on science policy and provides a
framework for analysing public funding systems in terms of ‘coordination modes’,
‘prototypical ways of organizing social action in a world where there is no overall
mind’ (p. 359). The analysis of van Vught (1997) deals with higher education policy
and distinguishes ‘planning’ and ‘market’ as two coordination mechanisms in this
domain.
Other contributions specifically address the interactions among different policies.
In 2008, a complete special issue of Science and Public Policy (issue 35, number 4)
has been dedicated to the coordination of knowledge and innovation policies. Braun
uses a functional definition of coordination, referring to efficiency and coherence as
its main objectives. Based on existing literature, he distinguishes between functional
and administrative coordination, which can each be further specified as strategic
coordination versus policy integration and positive versus negative coordination,
respectively (Braun 2008). Edler and Kuhlmann (2008) analyse formal and informal
interactions and relationships among ministries and governmental agencies, and
assess to what extent these contribute to the common effectiveness of their policies.
The study by Jennifer Clark (2010) deals with innovation and development centres
in the US and Canada and distinguishes between vertical coordination (linkages
among STI policy on various scales) and horizontal coordination (collaboration and
communication among different centres).
Third, some scholars have analysed specific processes on the micro-level, such as
collaborations between individual researchers or collaborations between universities
and firms. Cummings and Kiesler apply coordination to collaborative research
projects. For them, coordination activities are ‘activities that help project teams
integrate and best utilize their expertise’ (Cummings and Kiesler 2007: 1622).
Similarly, Sundberg’s study (2011) focuses on a specific kind of collaboration. In
her paper, coordination refers to the task division among individual researchers
within a certain specialty in loosely organized collaborations. Sundberg shows how
‘intercomparison projects’ in astrophysics, oceanography and meteorology deter-
mine which researchers are working on a particular problem. Bonaccorsi and
Piccaluga (1994) use the notion of ‘coordination procedures’ in their analysis and
taxonomy of university-industry relationships. These refer to ‘‘‘soft’’ managerial
aspects in interorganisational relationships that might determine their outcome
irrespective of the ‘‘hard’’ structure features’.
A Working Definition of Coordination in Science
The literature review above indicates that consensus about a coherent and
convincing concept of coordination in science is lacking. As scholars have used
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the notion of coordination to study various phenomena, with different goals, it is not
surprising that their (implicit or explicit) definitions of coordination vary (see
Table 1). Some studies use the term coordination to denote soft governance and
spontaneous interactions, in contrast with hierarchical rules or management (e.g.
Polanyi, Bonaccorsi and Piccaluga). In other contributions (e.g. Lepori, van Vught)
the term has a broader meaning comprising both hierarchical power and other
governance aspects.
In order to understand the mission of intermediary organizations, the existing
notions of coordination in science do not suffice; they are either too narrow or too
broad. Most of the definitions found in science (policy) studies are too restrictive to
describe the variety of functions of intermediary organizations in science. For
example, the definition of coordination by Cummings and Kiesler (2007) as
‘activities that help project teams integrate and best utilize their expertise’ (p. 1622),
is obviously limited to collaboration within given project teams. Interactions across
projects, or processes of mutual adjustment at the policy level are not included in
this definition. And Whitley’s concept of coordination (2003) refers to task division
across research sites, while (1) coordination can also occur at one particular
location, and (2) a competition among researchers each working on the same topic
should also count as coordination.
In contrast with these restrictive notions of coordination, the concepts used by
Lepori (2011) and Clark (1979) are too broad to serve my current purpose. Lepori’s
definition of coordination as ‘organizing social action in a world where there is no
overall mind’ (p. 359) and Clark’s (implicit) idea of coordination as ‘creating order
in loosely coupled systems’ are both inspiring, but further specification is required.
How can social action be organized, or how can order be created?
In order to develop a more specific formulation, I build on the interdisciplinary
study by Malone and Crowston who define coordination as ‘managing dependencies
between activities’ (Malone and Crowston 1994: 90). However, a couple of changes
are necessary. First, the idea of ‘dependencies’ deserves to be extended to
relationships in general. Some relationships addressed in earlier literature about
coordination in science, such as competition (Polanyi 1962; Lepori 2011), are not
easily conceived as dependencies: two competing activities are dependent on a
common resource rather than on each other. For this reason, I broaden the idea of
dependencies and include any relationships that can contribute to the effectiveness
of all activities present in the science system. What kinds of relationships these are
is an empirical question, but to illustrate the variety of possibilities I will list some
examples of relationships that may contribute to the performance of a system:
– Similarity: if two activities share a number of characteristics, this can lead to
synergies between them. For example, a coherent research programme might be
more effective than a random combination of independent projects.
– Complementarity: to avoid wasting resources, task division can be fruitful:
adjusting the scope or focus of different activities can help to avoid duplication.
– Competition: making several activities dependent on a common finite set of
resources can be a strong incentive to increase the effectiveness of each activity.
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– Acquaintance: mutual awareness among activities can help to exploit possible
synergies.
– Collaboration: sharing resources such as data, funding or knowledge can
increase the efficiency of activities.
– Synchronicity: purposeful timing of activities can increase their common
effectiveness, for example when one activity can give input to another, or when
both depend on a certain facility that can only serve one at the time.
– Proximity: geographical distance reduces the probability of physical contact,
mutual learning and exploiting spillovers, so locating several activities close to
each other can increase their effectiveness.
The second necessary adaption is the explicit inclusion of an effect. In everyday
discourse it is only appropriate to speak of coordination when the effectiveness of a
system is improved. If a director attempts to make the musicians in an orchestra play
in tune to improve its performance but fails to do so, one would not speak about
coordination. Analytically, however, the requirement of enhanced effectiveness is
difficult to hold. First, it is methodologically very difficult to measure effects on a
system-level as they often emerge on a longer term. Second, these effects can
impossibly be determined objectively, as any concept of system performance by
definition has a normative dimension, because it depends on the subject’s values and
his perspective on the given system. For this reason we define coordination not as
the realization of enhanced effectiveness, but rather as aiming for enhanced
effectiveness. In this context, ‘effectiveness’ can concern any conceivable type of
output or performance of the system, such as productivity, innovation or prestige. In
fact, a coordinating actor can give any meaning to effectiveness as long it concerns a
desired effect on the level of the system rather than on the level of individual
activities.
Incorporating these two aspects into the definition by Malone and Crowston
results in the following definition of coordination: the establishment or strength-
ening of a relationship among the activities in a system, with the aim to enhance
their common effectiveness.
In the context of the science system, this notion of coordination can be applied to
activities of various natures, on multiple aggregation levels, serving various goals.
I will give three examples to illustrate the applicability of this definition:
– A competitive funding instrument coordinates if it strengthens the competition
among different researchers in order to enhance their common productivity.
– A regular meeting between the directors of two research councils can be a form
of coordination when it helps to establish synchronicity among different policy
instruments, aiming to enhance their common effectiveness.
– The agreement between two universities to settle on a task division regarding
their research agendas could be defined as the establishment or strengthening of
complementarity among the research activities of different organizations, by
which the organizations hope to enhance their common societal impact.
It is crucial to distinguish between spontaneous and intentional coordination.
Intentional coordination implies that a particular actor chooses to intervene in a
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system aiming to enhance its performance (whatever this means to the actor).
Spontaneous coordination lacks such a goal at the system level. It simply emerges
from the behaviour of individual actors that are each acting for their own benefit
without caring about a goal on the system level. The research system contains a
complex combination of both forms of coordination.
Researchers interact with each other on multiple levels of aggregation. On the
operational level, individual researchers have regular contact with colleagues within
their own group or organization, and with fellow researchers in their scientific field.
On top of that, group leaders and other managers also interact with each other to
discuss university politics, policy and management issues. And on the level of
scientific fields, prominent scientists act as spokespersons that present the progress
and promises of their field to other fields and to a broader environment. We can
assume that in these interactions each of the actors acts (primarily) for their own
benefit, but still, coordination can emerge spontaneously as a result of their
individual actions (Polanyi 1962). For example, researchers compete for priority of
inventions and discoveries (Dasgupta and David 1994) and for scarce resources
(Ziman 1994). Their competitive relationship might lead to higher performance on
the system level. Moreover, researchers or research organizations may also decide
to collaborate by exchanging knowledge or other resources for their own benefit
(Bozeman and Corley 2004), thereby creating (spontaneous) benefits on the system
level as a side effect.
Intentional coordination is an intervention in a system, motivated by the perception
that existing (spontaneous) forms of coordination will fail. The actors can choose
from two possible strategies to intervene. First, they can strengthen an existing
coordination process. For example, by offering an open call for research proposals a
research council might strengthen the existing competition among researchers.
Second, they can decide to introduce a new coordination process, such as a market
place where supply and demand of a specific kind of knowledge meet each other, or a
rule that forces researchers to publish their findings in open-access journals. Note that
the distinction between spontaneous and intentional coordination is sometimes
blurred. For example, somebody organizing a conference may do so for the benefit of
his or her field, but also to gain a personal reputation. Given my interest in
intermediary organizations that have the explicit task to intervene in the science
system, the remainder of this paper will primarily deal with intentional coordination.
A Heuristic Tool for Analysing Coordination in Science
In order to systematically characterize coordination processes in the science system,
here I will introduce a heuristic based on seven key aspects:
1. The coordinating actor: many different individuals or organizations can
conduct coordination, such as a group leader, a research council or the Minister
of Science Policy.
2. The system addressed: coordination can address systems of various levels of
aggregation, such as a research group, a scientific field or a set of funding
instruments.
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3. The activities in this system that are subject to coordination: coordination may
address research activities, but it may also address other activities that are part
of science, such as funding allocation, foresight or research management.
4. The intervention taken to modify the relationships among these activities: this
aspect concerns the action taken to influence a system, such as changing the law,
organizing regular meetings, launching a technological promise or installing a
supervisory board.
5. The types of relationships that are established or strengthened by this
intervention: as indicated above, a variety of relationships may be involved,
such as collaboration, complementarity and synchronicity.
6. The mechanism making it possible that these relationships enhance the
effectiveness of the system: how can the new or strengthened relationships
enhance the system’s performance? This crucial aspect is responsible for the
possibility to coordinate. For example, collaborative relationships enhance the
performance of a system thanks to mutual learning and efficient usage of
resources.
7. The kind of performance of the system that the actor aims to enhance: the
effectiveness of a system can be conceived along various dimensions, according
to the perspective of the coordinating actor.
This heuristic does not adopt the typology of markets, hierarchies and networks,
which is common in sociological economic literature on coordination (Powell 1990;
Thompson et al. 1991). When analysing coordination processes in science, one will
often come across characteristics associated with markets, hierarchies and networks.
If one conceives funding decisions as transactions, funding mechanisms are
manifestations of different ‘coordination modes’ (Lepori 2011). Competitive project
funding by research councils can be modelled as a market, while block grant funding
is allocated in a more hierarchical way. However, in reality, many funding
mechanisms are ruled by mixes of coordination modes, rather than individual ones
(Lepori 2011). Competitive relationships, hierarchical decisions and collaborations
based on mutual trust are common features of the scientific enterprise, and it is
tempting to link them with the market, a hierarchy and a network, respectively.
However, when broadening the perspective beyond research funding, a classification
of processes in terms of these general categories will not help to distinguish
systematically between different coordination processes, as these characteristics refer
to different aspects of the process. A hierarchical decision refers to the intervention
that an actor makes to coordinate, competition concerns the relationships involved,
while trust is a mechanism that makes it possible to turn relationships into higher
effectiveness. Classifying coordination processes in terms of socio-economic ideal
types can lead to caricatures. For a systematic characterization, a more fine-grained
heuristic as presented above will be indispensable. Although I have explicated the
various aspects with several examples, empirical analysis will have to reveal what
kinds of actors, systems, activities, interventions, relationships, mechanisms and
performance are involved in coordination in science. As a first step in this direction,
in the remainder of this paper I will apply the heuristic to a case study of a Dutch
intermediary organization with a coordinating mission.
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Methods: Case Study
As a first empirical test of the framework developed above, I will now present a case
study of the Dutch task force Advanced Chemical Technologies for Sustainability
(ACTS). A case study seems an appropriate method as it will yield in-depth and
contextualized insights into the workings of intentional coordination processes. The
exploratory observations in this case can obviously not be generalized without
taking into account the specific national and disciplinary setting of this case. In a
later stage the preliminary conclusions of this case study should be complemented
using quantitative methods such as funding analysis, surveys or bibliometrics.
ACTS is an interesting case, as it has been established with an explicit
coordinating mission: ‘ACTS is a public private partnership between Dutch
government, universities, research institutes and industry in the field of sustainable
chemical technologies. Its mission is to initiate and support the development of
innovative technologies for the sustainable production of materials and energy
carriers. ACTS realises this mission by establishing and coordinating challenging
public private research programmes in accordance with the business plan of the
Regiegroep Chemie. These programmes consist of a coherent cluster of projects,
executed by universities and research institutes in close cooperation with industrial
partners’ (www.nwo.nl/acts, 29 December 2011).
This mission statement indicates that ACTS intends to fulfil a boundary role
between different institutional and epistemic cultures. Its aim is to establish
intensive collaboration between research activities of public research organizations,
on the one hand, and industry, on the other. Moreover, it strives for coherent clusters
of projects, implying alignment of the work of researchers with different
disciplinary backgrounds. The following section will show what interventions it
makes to this end.
Interestingly, ACTS is a relatively autonomous organization, but it is organi-
zationally associated with NWO (Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk
Onderzoek), the general Dutch research council. This special status implies a
possibility to develop a tailor-made approach to coordination, but it also implies a
need to maintain relationships with established parties.
ACTS was established in 2002 as part of a shift towards consortia-based funding
in the Dutch science system (Hessels and van Lente 2011). My analysis focuses on
its first cohort of research programmes (see Table 2). The new set of programmes
that ACTS is currently implementing under the heading of Technology Areas for
Sustainable Chemistry (TASC) falls beyond the scope of this paper.
The case study is based on document analysis and interviews. Strategy
documents, annual reports, evaluations and programme websites have provided
insights into the mission of ACTS and its programmes, visions on coordination,
actual coordination processes and (where possible) the effects of coordination. In
total, 27 interviews were conducted1 with researchers, programme committees,
ACTS board members and other actors involved in ACTS programmes (see
Table 3). For the interviews, we narrowed our focus to three programmes (B-Basic,
1 The interviews were conducted by the author or by research assistant Pepijn Wesselman.
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Sustainable Hydrogen and PoaC) to enhance the coherence of our dataset and to
facilitate triangulation. We asked researchers questions about their participation in
ACTS, in particular concerning funding acquisition, research evaluation, interac-
tions and collaborations. Interviews with others dealt with agenda-setting processes,
project selection, programme management and perceived outcomes of ACTS.
The findings were analysed using the heuristic framework on coordination
processes developed above. Combining the insights gained from interviews and
documents, I have made an inventory of active coordination processes at ACTS. In
the following section, I will present my observations about these processes in terms
of the seven aspects listed above. In this endeavour I focus on modes of
coordination that can be empirically observed rather than the coordination logics
guiding the actors involved.
Results
At ACTS I observed eight different coordination processes. ACTS contains many
different functions and processes, eight of which can be characterized as
interventions that establish or strengthen relationships among the activities in a
system, which enhance their common effectiveness. Two actors make these
Table 3 Interviews conducted
for the case study of ACTS
Function/level Number of interviews








Table 2 General information
about the first cohort of ACTS
research programmes
Source: ACTS website (21
February 2011). Amounts are





ASPECT (Advanced sustainable processes
by engaging catalytic technologies)
2004–2012 12.5
B-Basic (Bio-based sustainable industrial
chemistry)
2004–2009 50
IBOS (Integration of biosynthesis and
organic synthesis)
2003–2012 13.6
PoaC (Process on a chip) 2004–2013 8
Sustainable hydrogen 2002–2012 18.2
Total 102.3
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interventions: the executive board (EB) and the programme committees of the
different programmes of ACTS. These actors coordinate systems of different
aggregation levels. The coordination processes of the EB address chemical
technologies in general, while the programme committees each coordinate activities
in a specific field or sector. A further distinction can be made between processes that
exclusively address activities within ACTS, and processes extending beyond its
boundaries (see Table 4). The three processes identified ‘within ACTS’ are internal
interventions, only concerning relationships among activities part of ACTS. The
other five processes have a broader scope. These do not only address activities
within ACTS, but also activities of other researchers, firms and funding
organizations.
In the following, these processes will be characterized in more detail, describing
the other five aspects of my heuristic framework: the activities, intervention,
relationships and mechanism involved, and the kind of performance aimed for.
Where possible, I will also indicate whether the aspired performance has been
accomplished. I will first characterize four generic coordination processes (Table 5),
and then characterize four coordination processes that I found in specific
programmes or sectors (Table 6).
Bundling Research Plans
In the domain of chemical technologies, the acquisition power of a combined set of
research proposals turns out considerably larger than the sum of its parts. By
proposing a coherent research programme addressing a theme considered interesting
for society and or the economy, researchers can together acquire a lump sum of
public funding. The various ACTS programmes each have their own ‘birth history’,
but in all cases this governmental support has made it attractive for industry to join
as a co-sponsor. Given this public support, the programmes enable firms to explore
new innovation directions for a relatively low price. Firms are interested in
participating in these programmes for the knowledge these produce, for the sake of
networking with scientists and other firms, and for educating and scouting new
R&D staff. The firms typically pay only about 25% of all costs and still have a
significant influence on the programme goals and priorities. By aligning and
combining their research proposals, the researchers join forces and negotiate
collectively with firms, just like a labour union or farmers cooperation would. The
total amount of money acquired for the various ACTS programmes (see Table 2)
Table 4 Overview of the coordination processes in terms of the system addressed
Coordinating actor Coordination processes within ACTS Coordination processes beyond ACTS
Executive board Bureaucratic efficiency Bundling research plans
Alignment with NWO-CW
Alignment with other parties
Programme committees Interactions within programmes
Protecting IP
Platform for research programming
Competitive project selection
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indicates that this is a strong coordination mechanism. Both researchers and
industrial stakeholders have expressed that these investments would be much lower
without these programmes.
Alignment with NWO-CW
The office and the board of ACTS both function in close cooperation with the division
for chemical sciences (CW) of the Dutch research council NWO. Both organizations
share an office and several staff members, including a common director. During
regular staff meetings and by informal contact, both organizations inform each other
about their activities. This close collaboration enables the staff to create several
synergies. First and foremost, ACTS can build on NWO’s long tradition and
reputation of implementing research programmes. Thanks to their close proximity,
staff members can share both codified knowledge and tacit knowledge about
organizing competitive project selection and about keeping administration of running
projects. This learning from its sister organization saves ACTS time, and it also
strengthens its legitimacy. For all actors involved, the integration of ACTS within
NWO indicates that fair procedures will be guaranteed, regardless of industry
involvement. Strikingly, many of the researchers receiving ACTS funding do not
conceive of ACTS as a separate entity and use the names ACTS and NWO
interchangeably. A second synergy concerns the sharing of networks. For the planning
and implementation of their activities, both organizations strongly depend on the
Dutch chemical community: they need research leaders to initiate programmes and
write programme outlines, referees to conduct peer reviews of project proposals, and
industrial R&D managers for participating in, supervising or supporting programmes.
Third, the ACTS board indicates that a purposeful planning of its activities in relation
to the activities of NWO-CW can increase their common effectiveness. For example,
the experiences in a relatively fundamental research programme of NWO-CW could
lead to an initiative to explore the possibilities of starting a more application-oriented
programme in a related area in ACTS. Or, alternatively, a particular initiative in one of
the two organizations could be put on hold if it seems that there will be too much
overlap with an upcoming programme in the other domain.2
Alignment with Other Parties
ACTS has both formal and informal ties with several associated organizations in
order to enhance their common performance. First, the Dutch research school for
catalysis (NIOK) and its industrial advisory board (VIRAN) have located their
secretariats within the ACTS office to facilitate mutual adjustment, and both have a
seat in the ACTS Executive Board. Thanks to their close proximity they are well
2 It must be noted that these synergies do not apply to all programmes to the same extent. B-Basic, the
largest programme of ACTS, amounting to about half of its total budget, was initiated outside ACTS in
the context of the governmental Bsik framework for improving the Dutch knowledge infrastructure. As a
requirement for this funding instrument, all research funding was already assigned to individual projects
before it became part of ACTS. Moreover, its project administration has been divided between the ACTS
office and a dedicated office at the Technical University Delft.
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acquainted with each other’s activities, which increases the possibilities to
collaborate and benefit from each other’s knowledge and networks. However, we
have no indication that this significantly enhances their performance. Second, ACTS
is formally connected with the Regiegroep Chemie (RC), a powerful lobby club of
industrial and academic leaders. Given its power and prestige, ACTS has decided to
install RC as its supervisory board. Our interviews indicate close, informal contacts
among ACTS representatives and the RC members, but RC’s official role as a
supervisory board seems very limited. Altogether, thanks to regular interaction
ACTS can keep a close watch on developments and activities of some associated
organizations, but to what extent this increases its performance is unknown.
Bureaucratic Efficiency
The bundling of several programmes in ACTS has several advantages in terms of
bureaucratic efficiency. The ACTS board demands the programmes to conform to a
number of organizational standards, mainly concerning the procedures for funding
allocation and agreements about intellectual property. The organizational similarity
of the programmes enables ACTS to benefit from economies of scale. Experiences
with patents in one programme can be used to improve the IP agreements in other
programmes. Moreover, in order to facilitate fruitful university-industry collabo-
rations, ACTS enables the programmes to learn from each other. This happens with
respect to the complex, stepwise process of writing a research programme in
collaboration and selecting projects based on both scientific excellence and
industrial relevance. This helps to reduce overhead costs, but it also increases the
accountability of the programmes. Their organizational similarities enhance their
transparency for the research community, policymakers and industry. It must be
noted that the programmes also differ in many respects, for example, regarding the
precise role of industry in writing programme outlines and their influence in the
selection of researchers.3
Platform for Research Programming
ACTS functions as a platform where academic researchers and industry meet
around particular themes; it is a meeting place for knowledge supply and knowledge
demand. Two main interventions make this coordination process possible:
1. the facilitation of formal or informal consultation of industry, and collective
writing of research programme outlines
2. the inclusion of industrial relevance as a criterion in project selection
3 B-Basic has a deviating organizational structure. Its funding was already divided among projects in its
design phase, so it did not organize an open competition. Moreover, it has a ‘management team’ next to
its programme committee, and its administration is partly located at TU Delft rather than at the central
ACTS office. One ACTS board member speaks of a ‘‘LAT relationship’’ (Living Apart Together)
between ACTS and this programme. Our observations of this programme suggest that it does not benefit
from the bureaucratic efficiency of the other four programmes.
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Programmes use various ways to organize discussions between university and
industry. ASPECT and IBOS are based on a formal roadmap issued by the Ministry
of Economic Affairs (Technology Roadmap Catalysis: Catalysis, key to sustain-
ability 2002). The other programmes and their calls for proposals are based on more
informal brainstorms and debating sessions:
‘With the second call that we had, we clearly said at the beginning: right, first
go and talk with industry, and we have also told industry: please come up with
ideas of what you want to carry out within PoaC. In this way, projects were
written with a better fit between what industry wants, on the one hand, and
what the scientific world has to offer, on the other hand. We aligned this
better’ (member programme committee).
The second intervention is to use industrial relevance or applicability as an
official criterion for selecting projects. Its precise operationalization and weight
varied across the programmes and over time, but in all cases it has served as one of
the decisive criteria. Together, these two interventions provide industry with the
opportunity to influence the content of the programmes and projects.
This coordination process is directed at enhancing the benefits that the
programmes create for industry. Besides a couple of product or process innovations,
chemical firms have benefited significantly from the possibilities to train and recruit
new R&D staff and to strengthen their networks with other firms, which has led to
several new industrial collaborations and business opportunities. In addition, the
B-Basic programme has enhanced the societal awareness of a possible, bio-based
economy by implementing a substantial education project.
Interactions Within Programmes
The ACTS programmes have functioned as effective platforms to facilitate
interaction among researchers working on a similar topic. Regarding this type of
coordination, a distinction should be made between regular interactions and
collaborations.
Many ACTS researchers feel associated with the community of researchers
active in their programme, thanks to regular meetings with the whole programme or
with a subset of members working on a particular theme. On these occasions,
researchers give feedback to each other on the progress of their projects. As the
following quotes illustrate, the effects of such contact on the research direction
varies across projects:
‘And a number of times we have had meetings with all groups working within
B-Basic, or at least with those who had this in their portfolio, and everyone
worked a bit towards the same goal. We had a purely chemical approach, there
were also people of… I think it was DSM…who were trying to fix it in a more
enzymatic way, and… there was this other group collaborating with us that
wanted to use elements from us in their research question. But what I have to
say is that it was still mainly: we did our thing and they did their thing, so to
say’ (PhD student).
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‘An enthusiasm like ‘‘we have to accomplish something together’’. This has
also made people really talking to each other and trying: ‘‘given what I am
doing in a certain area on a certain compound, it is practical if somebody else
calculates something on the same compound’’. And not a completely different
one, what he would normally do, then he would pick something that he
fancies’ (full professor).
Programme and theme meetings have created several relationships among the
activities of some of the researchers. Researchers report cases of task division
(complementarity), thematic convergence (similarity), timing of activities (syn-
chronicity) and adjustments that make work more useful for fellow programme
members (relevance). These relationships seem strengthened by a shared notion of
the technological promise of their programme, which is often articulated in the form
of a prospective chain consisting of a number of challenges to be tackled (Bakker
et al. 2011). Apart from the contributions that these interactions have made to the
performance of the projects, they have also contributed to the human capital
developed. PhD students have learned about topics they would otherwise not have
come across, and they have built up a network that may be beneficial in a later
career stage.
Besides relations among researchers, the programmes also facilitate relationships
between researchers and industrial stakeholders. The strongest intervention to this
end is definitely the establishment of user committees. These groups of industrial
representatives give feedback on the progress of individual projects, themes or the
programme as a whole (aggregation level varies across programmes). Contact with
users increases the awareness of academic researchers of potential practical
applications for their work. This regularly leads to minor adjustments within
projects in order to enhance their relevance for industry, but in a few exceptional
cases a major influence on the research problem or approach has been reported,
when a PhD student chose to collaborate actively with a particular firm. In such a
case, complementary activities of academic and industrial researchers together lead
to industrial innovation.
A significant number of researchers actively collaborated within an ACTS
programme, in the sense of sharing resources for the sake of a common goal, such as
a publication. This sometimes concerned official collaborative projects purposefully
designed as a common activity for two or more organizations. In other cases
researchers spontaneously decided to collaborate on a particular part of their work.
Collaborations often enhance the efficiency of a programme, because it enables
exploiting ‘spillovers’, which implies that a relatively small additional effort can
yield an extra publication.
Protecting Intellectual Property Within Programmes
A relatively simple mechanism is in place to improve the protection of intellectual
property. In all programmes there is a rule that researchers should show the
manuscripts of their papers to industrial users before publishing. This intervention
increases the acquaintance of industry with the research results and gives them the
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opportunity to request a patent application.4 Although in most cases no further
action is taken, this rule increases the chances of successfully applying for patents
and of eventually creating economic benefits from the knowledge produced in
ACTS programmes.
Competitive Project Selection
Most programmes select their projects based on a competitive call for proposals and
external peer review according to standard NWO procedures. This means that the
programme committee uses the referee reports to make a ranking of projects, and
advises the EB which projects to fund.5 When ranking projects, committee members
have to leave the room when their own proposals are discussed. This selection
approach creates a competitive relationship among researchers interested in funding
from ACTS programmes. It challenges them to write proposals of sufficient quality
to beat the competition. The entrance to this competition is restricted to a limited
number of scholars working on topics that fit the call for proposals. Moreover, given
the decisive power of the programme committee, personal interests and preferences
can play a role. Given these two aspects, the market metaphor sometimes used
to describe competitive funding (Lepori 2011) seems inappropriate here. The
mechanism at work is like a beauty contest in which a jury evaluates the
participating proposals based on a formal set of criteria, combined with subjective
assessments. Challenged by this contest, the scientific field produces a number of
proposals that are of sufficient quality to satisfy the programme committee’s needs.
Synthesis
Comparing the various processes identified, a couple of general observations can be
made about the relationships, mechanisms and types of performance. The
interventions by ACTS are oriented at different types of performance. If we
postulate innovation in the chemical sector as the overall aim of all coordination
efforts by ACTS, most coordination processes address a particular sub-goal that
serves this aim, such as public funding, human capital and scientific productivity.
Almost all relationships that ACTS mobilizes by its coordination processes
imply proximity among the activities, in the sense that various activities are brought
closer together. Within this family of relationships, a gradual scale is visible,
ranging from weak ties (acquaintance) to stronger ties (similarity) and even
interdependence (collaboration). The exception to this rule is competition, which
implies that different activities are placed in mutual opposition rather than in a
coalition.
4 It should be noted that there is a lot of dissatisfaction on the sides of both academic researchers and
industrial users about the details of the IP agreements. However, this mainly concerns the rules about who
precisely is allowed to patent and how the potential revenues will be shared. The obligation to provide
access to knowledge before publication is relatively widely accepted as an adequate procedure.
5 B-Basic is a notable exception, as it has been funded by Bsik based on a competition with other
(aggregated) programme proposals already specifying a fixed set of projects and project leaders.
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The mechanisms at work seem quite varied and are difficult to summarize under a
common heading. Nevertheless, three mechanisms reoccurred in various processes,
which indicates that these might be rather general patterns: economies of scale,
learning and team work. The first regards the efficiency gained when activities are
undertaken collectively. Negotiating about research contracts collectively consume
less time than individually. And sharing knowledge and research facilities may
increase the total yield. The learning mechanism is similar but also involves the
principle that experiences are shared, including errors and mistakes. The mechanism
of team work concerns a task division that leads to synergies: actors carry out
complementary activities, with mutual benefits.
Conclusions and Discussion
Science systems are in transformation, but a sound, empirically-supported
understanding of the changes and continuities is lacking (Hessels and van Lente
2008). This paper deals with an increasingly prominent feature in the governance of
science: intermediary organizations with a coordinating mission. I use the current
rise of this type of organization as an opportunity to rethink the idea of coordination
and to empirically investigate manifestations of coordination in science. In this
endeavour I build on Lepori’s approach to coordination in science (Lepori 2011).
Extending his concept of coordination enabled me to address a broader set of
governance processes than research funding only.
Starting from the definition of coordination as the establishment or strengthening
of a relationship among the activities in a system, with the aim to enhance their
common effectiveness, I have developed a heuristic framework to systematically
characterize various types of coordination in the science system. The first benefit of
my framework is that it makes it possible to distinguish between spontaneous and
intentional coordination and to discern different levels of aggregation at which
coordination takes place. Second, it facilitates a systematic characterization of
coordination processes in terms of a limited number of key aspects.
A case study of the Dutch task force ‘Advanced Chemical Technologies for
Sustainability’ (ACTS) illustrates the strengths of my framework. The framework
made it possible to distinguish and characterize a number of coordination processes.
The insights gained by this exercise help to understand the functioning of a
coordination body such as ACTS. Thanks to the framework I could disentangle a
number of functions that ACTS fulfils concerning research programming, funding
allocation and supporting interactions and collaborations. This approach enabled me
to systematically analyse a very heterogeneous set of processes that each deserve to
be called coordination. The analysis yields a clear overview of eight coordination
processes, which are each described in terms of activities, intervention, relation-
ships, mechanisms and performance.
I have made a first step towards synthesizing the findings and identifying common
patterns among the coordination processes observed. A variety of interventions was
observed, ranging from setting rules for the allocation of funding to the physical co-
location of staff of different organizations. The observed coordination processes vary
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strongly regarding the types of performance aspired and the mechanisms involved. In
terms of relationships, however, some patterns are visible. Several processes utilize
similarity among activities, and in these cases, economies of scale is often the
responsible mechanism. In other cases, relevance or complementarity leads to higher
performance, thanks to the mechanism of teamwork, in the sense of effective task
division.
A number of striking outcomes of the case study deserve to be mentioned here.
First, the two strongest coordination processes concern the shaping of research
programmes in their design phase. The strongest benefits of ACTS seem to be the
enlarged negotiation power of a combined set of coherent research plans, and the
collaboration and task division with the division of chemical research (CW) at
NWO. Most of the coordination processes observed relate to the allocation of
funding. Only two of the eight coordination processes observed in total take place
after the money has been distributed to individual projects.
Second, ACTS hardly involves any hierarchical coordination with regard to the
research content. Both the direction of ACTS and the programme committees value
the autonomy of individual researchers to shape their own projects on the lab floor.
There are rules and regulations concerning the way that funding is allocated, but we
found hardly any evidence for hierarchical steering of the content of research.
ACTS provides soft incentives that stimulate mutual interaction among the
researchers in the programmes and protect the coherence of the research
programme, but no compelling structures are in place. Participants are invited
rather than forced to meet each other regularly, and there are little to no penalties for
researchers deviating from their original proposals. This leaves room for researchers
to benefit opportunistically from ACTS funding by adapting their research proposals
strategically to a programme’s needs, without making a real effort to contribute to
the programme’s goals (Morris 2000).
Third, ACTS hardly stimulates interaction among the programmes. One could
expect a task force like ACTS to enhance the common focus of the various
programmes or to stimulate collaborations among them for the sake of productivity,
interdisciplinary learning and innovation. In practice, however, the five programmes
of ACTS function to a large extent independently in terms of research. Bundling
them in one common organization creates synergies in terms of bureaucratic
efficiency, but not in terms of knowledge spillovers or research collaborations.
Empirical analyses of coordination in science are required for the governance of
science and innovation. In today’s policy discourse, coordination seems a popular
notion, with mainly positive connotations. This article has dealt primarily with the
(potential) benefits of coordination, but we must also be aware that coordination
comes with a price. Intermediary organizations like ACTS often have relatively low
overhead costs, as their management staff is hired only part-time. Still, there are a
number of hidden costs, in particular related to the time required to write research
proposals, negotiate about terms and conditions, assess and select research proposals
(both by programme committees and by external peers), and provide standardized
information that facilitates systematic monitoring and evaluations. Besides these
costs, a science system with too many coordinating bodies runs the risk that their
efforts interfere (van den Besselaar and Horlings 2010). This creates confusion for
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researchers, because they no longer understand which organization is responsible
for what, but it can also lead to the inhibition of effects if two organizations are
counteracting each other. Although such costs and risks cannot be addressed in the
current paper, they should be taken into account for making a full assessment of the
desirability of coordinating organizations.
To close, I will offer a few suggestions for further research on coordination in
science. First, after the qualitative case study presented here, quantitative
measurement of coordination using bibliometric analysis seems a fruitful avenue.
Mapping the trends in the research output of task forces like ACTS provides insight
in the degree to which the expected thematic similarity indeed develops among the
funded activities. The observations should be compared with a control dataset
covering the global output of the field or the output in a country where no
coordinating task force is active in the area. Co-authorship analysis can indicate
collaborative relationships. A detailed analysis of the portfolio of individual
researchers can reveal the influence of particular coordination interventions on their
research agenda.
Second, a comparison between coordination approaches in different scientific
fields is desired. As ‘authority relations’ vary across scientific fields (Gla¨ser et al.
2010), we can expect to find different coordination processes across scientific fields.
Whitley’s typology in terms of mutual dependence and task uncertainty (Whitley
2000) will be helpful here. Fields with a high technical dependence involve more
spontaneous coordination. For example, particle physicists have to plan their
activities collectively in order to make any progress (Knorr-Cetina 1999). In fields
with a high strategic task uncertainty, it will be more difficult to aggregate research
proposals and negotiate collectively for funding. Another interesting comparison is
between coordination in converging and diverging search regimes (Bonaccorsi
2008).
A third interesting empirical direction is to analyse coordination on the supra-
national level, such as in the European Framework Programmes. The European
Networks of Excellence employ a variety of approaches to coordination (Bonaccorsi
2010; Luukkonen et al. 2006), and they could form a valuable entry point to explore
the differences between national and international coordination processes. I expect
that the larger geographical distance, cultural barriers and varying institutional
contexts make coordination more difficult on a European scale. Another interesting
topic is the relationship between coordinating efforts at the national versus the
supra-national level. The choice of priority themes on the European level may be
purposefully copied in one country but deliberately ignored or even actively rejected
in another. Given the continuing shift towards European research funding, the
effects of interfering coordination on national and supra-national levels will be a
complex but increasingly topical research issue.
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